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1 Introduction
The evolution of poverty and inequalities within a country is a complex process that combines changes
of the macroeconomic environment, of behaviours and institutions, and all their possible interactions.
Yet, it is very important for policy makers and researchers to understand the specic role of institutions
and, more precisely, the role of tax-benet instruments which directly a¤ect income distribution. In
this respect, the EUs Lisbon agenda includes a high-level goal of achieving greater social cohesion and
requires the assessment of policy changes at national levels in order to understand how National Action
Plans achieve their objectives in the light of social indicators as those xed at Laeken in 2001 (Atkinson
et al., 2002).
Tax-benet microsimulation is a pragmatic tool that has been used extensively for this purpose (Atkin-
son, 2005).1 However, if economists are to provide useful information for policy purposes, two important
questions deserve attention. First, what is the relevant benchmark to be used when evaluating actual
policy changes? Second, how to capture the change in the distribution of disposable income due solely
to changes in tax-benet policy?
The present paper suggests a decomposition methodology which helps on both counts. It is based on
the construction of appropriate counterfactual distributions using microsimulation. The change in the
distribution of disposable income summarized by any poverty or inequality measures is decomposed
between three types of e¤ects: the change in policy structure, the change in the nominal levels of policy
parameters relatively to change in income levels, and other changes not directly linked to tax-benet
policies. The last e¤ect includes changes in the distribution and composition of gross income, i.e. income
before taxes and transfers,2 as well as changes in demographics.3
Firstly, disentangling policy changes between structural reforms and changes in nominal levels of
tax-benet monetary parameters (e.g. benet amounts, thresholds of income tax brackets, etc.) helps to
measure the absolute e¤ect of policy reforms against a distributionally neutral benchmark, i.e. a situation
where monetary parameters are nominally adjusted in line with income growth.4 This approach is applied
to assess policy changes in ten European countries for the period 1998-2001, to France for 1995-2001 and
to Ireland for 1994-2000.
Secondly, the full decomposition allows us to assess the relative role of policy changes compared to
other changes in the underlying population (gross income, demographics, etc.).5 We conduct this exercise
1See Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) for a comprehensive exposition on microsimulation.
2Naturally, tax-benet changes a¤ect the distribution of gross income and demographics by changing incentives to work,
invest, have children, marry, etc. To capture these indirect e¤ects, the approach proposed could well be combined with
behavioral models; in particular, it could incorporate labour supply responses (see, among others, Creedy et al., 2006). In
the present paper, we ignore these behavioural e¤ects and isolate key issues which would also arise in such wider framework.
3Changes in the demographic composition over time a¤ect the distribution of equivalised income of a given non-equivalised
distribution.
4 In other words, lack of adjustment of monetary tax-benet parameters  or adjustments which are not in line with
income growth over the period will have an impact on inequality.
5A few studies, like Nolan and Maitre (2000) for Ireland, suggest a meticulous investigation of policy changes and the way
they interact with other factors to explain inequality changes. The present approach provides a framework to disentangle
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on France 1995-2001 and Ireland 1994-2000; we nd that some of the results are robust with respect to
the decomposition method, i.e. whether counterfactuals of policy changes are based on initial or nal
data. Others vary with the method especially for Ireland where important changes take place in which
case the need for regularly updated income survey data, or representative panel data, is emphasised.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition approach. Section 3
describes briey the data. Section 4 reports the absolute e¤ects of policy change on inequality in twelve
European countries. Section 5 focuses on France and Ireland to gauge the relative e¤ect of policy changes
compared to other factors. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Decomposition Approach
2.1 Overview and Denitions
We rst introduce some notations and terminology. We denote by household gross income the total
amount of capital, labor and replacement incomes (including unemployment benets and pensions) be-
fore taxes and benets. Disposable income is the household income that remains after payment of
taxes/social contributions and receipt of all transfers; in the context of microsimulation studies, this is
the relevant concept for measurement of poverty and inequality.
The distribution of disposable income is represented hereafter as a transformation di(pk; ylj) of the
underlying population ylj ;
6 the latter is characterized by two reference points: the nominal level of all
income variables is that of year l while the distribution of income (and other characteristics like demo-
graphics) is that of year j.7 The nominal level is represented by the average income level of year l,
as made clear below. Implicit in transformation d is the e¤ect of the tax-benet system on households
with di¤erent gross incomes (and di¤erent demographic characteristics). Disposable income thus depends
on tax-benet rules and non-monetary parameters (e.g. tax rates); in the above notations, this policy
structureis that of year i. It also depends on p, the set of monetary parameters for tax-benet calcu-
lations (e.g. maximum benet amounts, threshold level of tax brackets, etc.); the nominal level of these
parameters is that of year k.
With the notations above, we can easily represent counterfactual situations. For instance, d0(p1; y10)
represents disposable incomes when nominal levels of parameters and gross incomes are those of year 1
while the denition of tax-benet rules and population characteristics (gross income inequality, demo-
graphics, etc.) are those of year 0. We are interested in inequality/poverty indices computed from the
these e¤ects and to quantify the relative contribution of policy changes to variations in poverty/inequality.
6Generally speaking, ylj can be thought of as a matrix where each line represents a household by a vector of characteristics,
including various incomes, socio-demographic characteristics, etc. However, we refer to ylj as an income vector in the
following since income distribution is the main dimension of interest in this study. These are pure notational subtleties
since microsimulation models do account for all relevant dimensions (type of income, treatment of family size, etc.) when
computing disposable income.
7Trivially, data collected in year 0 will contain a series of incomes y00 :
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(simulated) distribution of disposable income for a given year or for counterfactual situations. Denote G
any such measure, expressed in what follows as a function G

di(p
k; ylj)

of the distribution of disposable
income.
There are, however, some systematic di¤erences between microsimulation estimates of the distribution
of income and those based directly on survey measures. In particular, full take-up of transfers is often
assumed while there is evidence that non-take-up can be large, hence a quasi-systematic underestimation
of poverty by the models (see Hancock et al., 2003). Such di¤erences in levels of poverty need not,
however, have much inuence on analysis of changes in poverty such as that set out here.
We shall assume that the simulated distribution of disposable income dh(ph; yhh) for a given year h
is the true distribution for that year. Naturally, there are limits to this assumption. Mantovani and
Sutherland (2003) discuss the robustness of the simulations using the European model EUROMOD by
comparing simulated and o¢ cial measures of income distribution for years 1998 and 2001. Comparability
is not easy since other sources of information about income distribution may use di¤erent denitions of
equivalence scales, di¤erent datasets and years, incorporate in-kind benets, etc. There are, however,
some systematic di¤erences between microsimulation estimates and those based directly on survey mea-
sures. In particular, simulations do not take into account possible non-take-up of social benets, which
leads to underestimation of poverty (see Hancock et al., 2003, for take-up correction within microsim-
ulation). In the following empirical application (Section 4), we shall validate our results again external
sources.
2.2 Decomposition
Characterize total change  in the inequality/poverty index G between initial period 0 and nal period
1 as:
 = G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d0(p0; y00)
This change in the distribution of disposable income as summarized by index G can be decomposed
into the contribution of the change in the tax-benet policy (policy e¤ect) and the contribution of other
factors like variations in the underlying gross income distribution, in demographics, etc. (data e¤ect).
Remark that a straightforward application of the initial (nal) policy on the nal (initial) data may not
be correct. For instance, consider the following decomposition:
 =

G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d1(p1; y00)	+ G d1(p1; y00) G d0(p0; y00)	
= (data e¤ect conditional on policy 1) + (policy e¤ect conditional on data 0)
This decomposition might be acceptable as a rst approximation if initial and nal years are close enough.
However, in the second bracket, the system of year 1 is applied to data of year 0, ignoring the fact new
monetary parameters (benet amounts, levels of tax allowance, etc.) may have been adjusted to account
to some extent for price and wage ination over the period. For instance, the eligibility threshold of social
benets may have been adjusted in line with wage ination; in this case, the new system will appear more
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redistributive than it is if assessed on data 0 (that is, on lower gross income levels). It is thus necessary
to evaluate the policy changes in the light of nominally adjusted data (see Callan et al., 2006).
To do so, we apply to both monetary parameters and income levels of year 0 a coe¢ cient 1 cor-
responding to the actual change in average gross income levels between the two years. If y represents
simply the distribution of gross income  a simplied interpretation for the sake of exposition  then
the counterfactual y10 = 
1y00 corresponds to initial gross incomes nominally adjusted to year 1. As for
parameters, the nominally adjusted schedule is written 1p0. Note that it is not equivalent to p1, which
represents the actual set of parameters in year 1, i.e. as decided by the authorities. The actual parameters
are not necessarily adjusted in line with progression in average income.8
Then we can suggest a rst complete decomposition:
 =

G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d0(1p0; y11)	 (change in policy) (1)
+

G

d0(
1p0; y11)
 G d0(1p0; y10)	 (change in data)
+

G

d0(
1p0; y10))
 G d0(p0; y00)	 (change in nominal levels)
where the last term extracts the e¤ect of leveling up both the initial tax-benet monetary parameters
(p0 to 1p0) and the initial incomes (y00 to y
1
0). Conditional on the policy structure of year 0, and for
nominal levels of year 1, the second term corresponds to the change in data (underlying distribution of
gross income, demographic structure, etc.). The rst term captures the e¤ect of the tax-policy change
over the period, conditional on nal year data. Interestingly, and in line with our objective, it reects the
change in policy structure (d0 to d1) but also the actual change in nominal levels of monetary parameters
(p1) compared to a distributionally neutral situation where monetary parameters are exactly in line with
average income growth over the period (1p0).
We also introduce the alternative decomposition where the e¤ect of policy changes is conditional on
initial rather than nal data. Here too, policy changes combine structural changes (from d0 to d1) and
parameter changes (from 1p0 to p1). Therefore, the policy e¤ect must be conditional on the initial data
expressed in nominal levels of the nal data. This yields the decomposition:
 =

G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d1(p1; y10)	 (change in data) (2)
+

G

d1(p
1; y10)
 G d0(1p0; y10)	 (change in policy)
+

G

d0(
1p0; y10))
 G d0(p0; y00)	 (change in nominal levels)
where the third term is unchanged compared to (1). The rst term is the e¤ect of other changes (gross
income distribution, demographics, etc.) conditional on the policy structure and nominal levels of the
base period data.
It could be argued that coe¢ cient 1 should be di¤erentiated by types of income (labor income,
8A well-know example is the bracket creep, i.e. the non-indexation of tax brackets on income growth that results in
scal drag (see Immervoll, 2005).
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unemployment benet, pension, capital income, etc.).9 For instance, one might be willing to compare
the actual change in minimum pension levels to a benchmark in line with pension growth. We think, in
contrast, that the distributionally-neutral benchmark should reect the change in the average standard
of living. For this reason, we use a single coe¢ cient computed as the growth rate of all pooled incomes.
If it is to be distributionally neutral, the reference situation must not distort the relative income levels
of, say, pensioners compared to unemployed or salary workers. The structure of income composition in
the population participates in shaping gross income inequalities and its change, compared to a situation
where all income sources progress in parallel, is captured in the second term of (1) and rst term of (2).
In contrast, the terms capturing the policy e¤ect ensure that the distribution but also the composition
of gross income is held constant.
2.3 Homogeneity Property and Simplication
We argue that the tax-benet system is often linearly homogenous,10 that is:
di(p
k; ylj) = d0(p
0; y00):
Clearly, the adaptation of tax rules following the introduction of the Euro has been straightforward
in most EU countries. This property can be illustrated by looking at an over-simplied system that
captures the essence of most tax-benet systems. Assume that the rst instrument is a progressive tax
schedule composed of two brackets with marginal rates tz and thresholds hz (z = 1; 2). A universal
child benet grants an amount C for each child if household gross income is lower than a threshold F .
Finally, a minimum income is computed as a basic income B minus a proportion  of other incomes.
Then disposable income of a household with income y and x children is:
d = c+max(0; B   c)
with c = y   f(y   h2)t2 + (h2   h1)t1g+ 1(y < F ):xC
Homogeneity is straightforward when multiplying income y and all monetary parameters B; h2; h1; F and
C by the same coe¢ cient.
Consequently, a simultaneous change in nominal levels of both incomes and parameters should not
a¤ect the relative location of households in the distribution of disposable income. Then, for well-behaved
measures G of income distribution which do not change with nominal levels, the function G  d should
be homogenous of degree zero:
G

d0(
1p0; 1y00))

= G

d0(p
0; y00)

(3)
9A practical reason to refrains from doing so is the impossibility to apply di¤erentiated coe¢ cients when tax-benet
instruments apply to a pool of di¤erent income sources (e.g. income tax usually apply to the aggregation of earnings,
unemployment benets, pensions, etc.).
10An interesting exception in Europe is the quadratic form of the German income tax system.
5
and the last terms in (1) and (2) should disappear.11 Thus the decompositions (1) and (2) simpliy to:
 =

G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d0(1p0; y11)	 (change in policy) (I)
+

G

d0(
1p0; y11)
 G d0(p0; y00)	 (change in data)
and
 =

G

d1(p
1; y11)
 G d1(p1; y10)	 (change in data) (II)
+

G

d1(p
1; y10)
 G d0(p0; y00)	 (change in policy)
Then the rst term of (I) and the second of (II) are measures of the absolute e¤ect of the policy change
on disposable income distribution against a distributionally-neutral situation. On practical grounds, the
rst measure requires the knowledge of data 1 while the second requires data 0. Typically, microsimulation
studies use cross-sections of the initial year (year of data collection) while data of the nal year are not
available. This can be due to infrequency of data collection or simply the fact that period 1 corresponds
to future budgets or hypothetical systems. In consequence, our rst empirical exercise (Section 4) will
apply the measure suggested by decomposition (II):
G

d1(p
1; y10)
 G d0(p0; y00) (4)
using base period data only.
3 Data and Simulation
Simulations for all countries except France and Ireland are performed using the tax-benet calculator
EUROMOD. This model has been designed to simulate the tax-benet systems of the EU-15 countries.
For each country, it computes all direct taxes and monetary transfers, and hence disposable income, for
all the households of a representative dataset (see description in Sutherland, 2001). The choice of initial
system (1998) and nal system (2001) is constrained by what is made available in the latest version of
EUROMOD. In addition, we use the French microsimulation model SYSIFF, described in Bargain and
Terraz (2001), to simulate the French system in 1995 and 2001, and the Irish model SWITCH, described
in Callan et al. (1996) for the Irish system in 1994 and 2000.
The data used in Section 4 are described in Table 1. As aforementioned, the absolute measure of the
policy e¤ect using (II) requires data for the initial period only, that is, 1995 for France, 1994 for Ireland
and 1998 for all the other countries. As indicated in Table 1, however, the year of collection matches the
initial year of simulation only for Austria, Finland, Germany, France and Ireland. For other countries,
11Simulations conrm that Lorenz curves obtained using d0(p0; y00) and d0(
1p0; 1y00)) overlap; inequality measures
di¤er by less than 1% and poverty measures by less than 2%. As previously discussed, this result requires the use of a
unique factor on all types of incomes. If di¤erentiated  coe¢ cients were used for each income source, the distribution of
gross income would change, i.e. G(1y00) 6= G(y00):
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datasets are a bit older so that the previous methodology cannot be applied perfectly. For those, 1998
data are obtained by updating monetary variables using di¤erentiated coe¢ cients for di¤erent income
sources but necessarily assuming that there were no other changes (in gross income composition and
distribution, in demographic structure, etc.) between the two years
The last column provides the updating coe¢ cient 1 that allows nominal adjustment between years 0
and 1 for all countries as previously described. It is calculated as the growth rate of average gross income
over the relevant period.
The second exercise (Section 5) consists in applying the full decompositions to capture the relative
e¤ect of policy changes. In this case, decompositions (I) and (II) require data for both initial and nal
periods. For that purpose, we focus on France and Ireland for which such data are available. Initial data
for France (1995) and Ireland (1994) are described in Table 1. In addition, we use the French Household
Budget Survey 2001, which contains 25,803 observations, and the Living in Ireland Survey 2000,which
contains 11,450 observations.
Table 1: Data Desciption
Country Data Collectionyear
no. of
observations
no. households
(weighted) updating factor*
Austria European Community Household Panel 1998 7,386 3,238,520 5.7%
Belgium Panel Survey on Belgium Households 1997 7,057 4,028,723 7.2%
Denmark European Community Household Panel 1995 7,044 2,531,183 6.2%
France Household Budget Survey 1994/5 29,158 23,487,099 14.2%
Finland Income Distribution Survey 1998 25,010 2,355,000 7.4%
Germany German Socio-Economic Panel 1998 18,227 38,259,778 10.7%
Greece European Community Household Panel 1995 15,062 3,720,085 15.5%
Ireland Living in Ireland Survey 1994 14,585 1,130,695 36.1%
Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth 1996 23,924 19,816,115 14.2%
Portugal European Community Household Panel 1996 14,468 3,211,572 9.8%
Spain European Community Household Panel 1996 18,991 12,347,454 23.9%
UK Family Expenditure Survey 1995/6 16,586 24,490,138 6.8%
* This factor is computed for the period 1998-2001, except for Ireland (1994-2000) and France (1995-2001).
4 Absolute E¤ect of Tax-Benet Policies
Measure G could be chosen among many inequality and poverty indices. In this section, we simply use
the Gini coe¢ cient to illustrate the methodology suggested above. Results are presented in Table 2.
The Gini for the initial year corresponds to G

d0(p
0; y00)

in (4), also expressed as G

d1(
1p0; y10)

due
to homogeneity, while the Gini for nal year, G

d1(p
1; y10)

, is obtained by grossing up the data using
coe¢ cient 1. As explained above, the absolute measure captures the distributional impact of changes
in policy structure and the actual adjustments in monetary parameters compared to adjustments in line
with the growth of average gross incomes.
First of all, the Gini for period 0, as calculated using microsimulation models, are broadly in line with
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other ndings as indicated by the comparison of the rst and last columns of Table 2.
Then, our results point out towards substantial e¤ects of policy changes in France, Finland, Greece,
Ireland and the UK. In Greece, the large decrease in inequality reects changes in policy structure (e.g.
social contribution rebate for low earners in 2000) but also nominal adjustment (e.g. large increase in
real terms of the social pensions, farmersbasic pension and pensioner social solidarity benet). In the
UK, it may reect important structural changes (e.g. extension in 1999 of the refundable tax credit
for low-earner families) but also nominal changes (e.g. council taxes have been regularly raised above
ination, a¤ecting more families with high incomes; income support for pensioners has been increased).
In Finland, inequalities due to tax-benet policies have increased, partly as a result of a reduction in the
progressivity of the tax system; indeed, the (at-rate) State tax has been increased while (progressive)
municipal taxation has been decreased. Results for France and Ireland are detailed in the next Section.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our results to Förster and dErcole (2005). The comparison is
imperfect since the authors study changes in inequality/poverty over the 1994-1999 period while we focus
on 1998-2001 for most countries. However, periods match quite well for France and Ireland. Interestingly,
our results capture the change in inequality due to policy changes while Förster and dErcole document
the overall change in the Gini. It turns out that the trend in France is similar while results are complete
opposite for Ireland, meaning that the policy e¤ect and other factor must play in the same direction in
the former countries but in opposed ways in the latter. More precisely, recent Irish policy development
must have contributed to increase inequality (as reported in Table 2) while other factors have o¤set this
e¤ect, leading to reduced inequality as documented by Förster and dErcole. We quantify these e¤ects
in the next section.
Table 2: Absolute E¤ect on Inequality of the Change in Tax-benet System
Country
Period 0 Period 1* policy effect(absolute)
policy effect
(% change) source Gini
Austria 24.5 24.2 -0.3 -1.1% Dennis and Guio (2003) 26
Belgium 25.3 25.3 0.0 0.1% Socio-Economic Panel 97 24.8
Denmark 25.4 25.1 -0.3 -1.2% Danish register data 97 25.7
France 29.9 29.4 -0.5 -1.8% ECHP, Eurostat, 1995 30
Finland 25.8 26.5 0.7 2.8% Riihelä et al. (2005) 26
Germany 26.5 26.6 0.1 0.4% Dennis and Guio (2003) 25
Greece 35.3 34.2 -1.1 -3.0% Dennis and Guio (2003) 34
Ireland 29.0 30.4 1.4 4.8% Dennis and Guio (2003) 32
Italy 35.1 34.7 -0.4 -1.1% Italian Household Budget 98 34.3
Portugal 38.1 38.6 0.5 1.2% Dennis and Guio (2003) 36
Spain 33.1 33.7 0.5 1.6% Dennis and Guio (2003) 33
UK 31.9 30.7 -1.1 -3.6% Dennis and Guio (2003) 32
Gini are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale (zeros are bottom-coded as 10E-1)
Period 0 is 1998 for all countries except Ireland (1994) and France (1995); period 1 is 2001 for all countries except Ireland (2000)
* Disposable incomes for period 1 are simulated on the basis of period 0 incomes, nominally adjusted to period 1.
Gini from other sources**
** Measures in Dennis and Guio (2003) are based on the ECHP for 1998 incomes; measures based on Danish register Data 1997 are published in the Luxembourg Income Study; those from
'Italian Household Budgets 1998' are published by the Bank of Italy (2000).
Gini on disposable income
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5 Relative E¤ect of Tax-benet Policies: France and Ireland
In this section, we decompose the role of policy changes versus other factors in explaining changes in
income distribution. Other factors are complex, including changes in the macroeconomic environment,
the e¤ect of other policies (unemployment benets, minimum wage, etc.) and the indirect e¤ect of tax-
benet policies via behavioural responses. We apply both decompositions I and II on France (period
1995-2001) and Ireland (period 1994-2000).
Table 3 presents the results for a battery of indicators. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient
and the Atkinson index (" = 0:5) has slightly decreased in France, by between 2 and 4.5 per cent. In
Ireland, there is a somewhat greater fall (between 4 and 8 per cent).12 The two countries diverge when
higher aversion to inequality is assumed: the Atkinson index (" = 1:5) increases in Ireland and decreases in
France. This reects that income growth has been more homogenous in France while inequality reduction
has occurred mostly within the second half of the distribution in Ireland. This is conrmed by the ratio
of upper incomes to median, which decreases in Ireland while the gap between upper and lower incomes
widens. In addition, the headcount ratio with poverty line at 60% of the median falls slightly in France
but rises by around 50% in Ireland.
What is the relative role of tax-benet policy and of other factors in these developments? In France,
policy changes explain most of the change in inequality and poverty measures; this result is conrmed
using either decomposition. Other factors play a small role, often not signicant or with a diverging
sign depending on the index under consideration; in particular, they contribute to an increase in the
headcount ratio with a line at 60% of the median but to a decrease in the headcount ratio with line at
50% (not represented) and in the Atkinson index with " = 1:5.
There was little policy change in the late 1990s and welfare payment rates have been raised only after
1997 to catch up with average income (the most noticeable increase concerns the unemployment assistance,
Allocation de Solidarité Spécique, in 1998). It seems that the trend captured in our results rather rather
stems from structural changing of years 2000-2001, and in particular the reform of housing benets
and the introduction of a modest refundable tax credit for low-wage individuals, two measures that have
beneted primarily to the lowest part of the distribution (see CERC, 2006). Outside of tax-benet policy,
key factors have been the economic recovery of the 1997-2001 period and declining unemployment (from
11.3% in 1995 down to 8.8% in 2001). Recent growth has taken some time to trickle down to poverty
levels (see the detailed analyses in CERC 2006 and Demailly and Raynaud, 2006). The number of people
on welfare (RMIrecipients) continued to climb until 1999 then decreased from 1,12 million in 1999 to
1.05 in 2001. Moreover, wage moderation has accompanied the implementation of the new legislation on
reduced working time in 2001.
12Table 2 shows that the simulated Gini for France is close to the measure obtained using the ECHP. It is however
overstated compared to measures using the tax revenue data (INSEE-DGI, enquete Revenus Fiscaux, 1996), giving a Gini
around 0.27. For Ireland, a Gini of 0.29 in the initial period is lower than measures from the ECHP (0.32) and from the raw
data in the Living in Ireland Survey (0.33), probably reecting the extent of unclaimed benet in the actual data. Trends
observed in Table 3 are nonetheless conrmed by these other sources.
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While decompositions I and II lead to similar conclusions in France, results seem more sensitive to the
method for Ireland. This is primarily due the fact that e¤ects are much larger in this country, following
the dramatic change in the economy in the late 1990s and the very large fall in unemployment rate (from
15% to 5% over the period). Nevertheless, some key results are robust with respect to the choice of
decomposition method. The Gini and Atkinson indices, along with the percentile ratios P90/P10 and
P50/P10, conrm that the direct inuence of policy changes over the period was to increase inequality
while other factors tended to decrease it. Both policy changes and other e¤ects contribute to increase
the head count, poverty gap ratio and weighted poverty gap ratio with poverty line at 60% median as
well as the Atkinson index with high inequality aversion.
As far as policy changes are concerned, income tax cuts have clearly reduced the progressivity of the
system and contributed to widen the gap between the second half of the distribution and the bottom, as
indicated by the percentile ratios. In addition, welfare payment rates have failed to keep pace with the
growth in income so that the relative position of the poorest disimproved in the second half of 1990s, as
translated by poverty trends.13
As for other factors, not directly due to taxes and benets, it turns out that the sharp fall in unem-
ployment has acted to reduce most of the inequality measures. There is less indication of the widening
in earnings dispersion which accompanied the rapid economic growth in the 90s. As noted by Nolan and
Maitre (2000), this trend has been primarily driven by relatively rapid increases for those at the very
top of the distribution, which is not captured by the P90 percentile reported here. According to Nolan
and Maitre, there was no indication that the bottom has been falling behind the median, as conrmed
here by the quasi-stagnation of the P50/P10 ratio for other e¤ects. When the focus is on the poorest,
however, the impact of these other factors was to raise the poverty indices (and the Akinson index with
" = 1:5). Instances where falling unemployment has also been associated with a rise in the risk of relative
poverty have also been found in Immervoll et al. (2005a).
6 Concluding Comments
This paper suggests a decomposition of the trends in inequality and poverty into the contribution directly
due to tax-benet policy changes and the contribution of other factors, including changes in gross income
distribution. This allows us to establish an absolute measure of the policy e¤ect in which the benchmark
is distributionally neutral, i.e. in line with income growth over the period. Policy changes which do
not adjust monetary tax-benet parameters along these lines may a¤ect (disposable income) inequality.
While not unique, the measure proposed has the merit not requiring the data for the nal year while
being consistent with the suggested decomposition.
We also apply the full decomposition to two countries. We nd that policy changes have had important
inuences in both Ireland and in France over the late 1990s. For France, policy impacts have tended to
13Nolan and Maitre (2000) show that the share of social transfers declined substantially in the period 1994-1997, conrming
that social welfare support rates lagged behind the very rapid pace of growth in earnings.
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Table 3: Decomposition of the Inequality/Poverty Change
Period 0 Period 1 Total change tax-benefitpolicy effect
Other
effects
tax-benefit
policy effect
Other
effects
Ireland 1994-2000
Gini (%) 29.0 27.7 -1.3 0.7 -2.0 1.4 -2.7
Atkinson 0.5 6.7 6.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.8 0.7 -1.2
Atkinson 1.5 18.3 20.6 2.3 1.0 1.3 2.0 0.3
P90/P10 3.5 3.8 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.3
P90/P50 2.0 1.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P50/P10 1.7 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
FGT0(%) - 60% median 13.4 19.8 6.4 2.8 3.6 6.0 0.5
FGT1(%) - 60% median 1.5 4.4 2.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.2
FGT2(%) - 60% median 0.4 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7
France 1995-2001
Gini (%) 29.9 29.2 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.1
Atkinson 0.5 7.4 7.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Atkinson 1.5 20.9 19.8 -1.2 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6
P90/P10 3.5 3.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
P90/P50 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P50/P10 1.8 1.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
FGT0(%) - 60% median 13.3 12.7 -0.6 -1.5 1.0 -1.0 0.5
FGT1(%) - 60% median 2.8 2.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
FGT2(%) - 60% median 1.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
The tax-benefit policy effect is measured on the basis of data at period 0 (resp. 1) in decomposition I (resp. II). The anchored poverty line is calculated as 60% of the median
in period 0 and updated using the same nominal adjustment as for data and tax-benefit parameters for period 1.
Decomposition I Decomposition II
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equalize incomes and reduce relative income poverty; for Ireland, the reverse is the case. In the Irish
case, overall inequality falls because of other factors, including changes in the distribution of gross income
as unemployment fell sharply. For France, policy changes were the main driving force in the change in
inequality over this period. These results show the value of evaluating policy reforms in conjunction
with other structural changes in the population if their inuence on inequality is to be understood and
measured accurately.
Results for France are not sensitive to the decomposition method, i.e. either based on the initial or
the nal period. For Ireland, however, some di¤erences are interesting and deserve further investigation.
In this line of thought, Musgrave and Thin (1948, p. 510) note that [. . . ] the less equal the distribution
of income before tax, the more potent will be a (given) progressive tax in equalizing income.14 The
assessment of policy change may then depend on the reference point. For Ireland, the regressive e¤ect of
recent policy changes appear larger in absolute terms when estimated on the more equal distribution of
gross income (i.e. on the nal year using decomposition II).
If changes in market income are important and if both initial and nal data are not available, mi-
crosimulation studies can only give us a partial information. The potential e¤ect of policy on inequalities
can be measured but its contribution to overall trends in inequality cannot be assessed. This empha-
sizes the need for repeated cross section for all years or, ideally, the use of representative panel data for
analyzing the redistributive e¤ects of tax-benet systems.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that if changes in market income are important, microsimulation
estimates based only on the initial year only give us very partial information on likely trend in inequality
and poverty. This is so not only because tax-benet policies explain only part of the trend but also because
the possible interaction with changes in gross income are not accounted for. The second decomposition
suggested in this paper contributes to provide some preliminary information in this respect. A closer
analysis of policy impacts would require the use of more regular (ideally, annual) data as a basis for the
analysis.
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